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Published in:
Rastko Močnik & Aldo
Milohnić (eds.), Along the Margins of
Humanities.
Seminar in Epistmology of the Humanities, Ljubljana: Institutum Studiorum
Humanitatis, 1996, pp. 103-136 |
Family Disturbances Metaphors, Similes and the Role of
'Like' A study on Continuity and Inreducibility Between Comparisons, Similes, and Metaphors "Virtual reality is wholy, totally real,
but not!" "Short cuts", R. Altman Abstract The relationship between metaphors and similes has been the
main topic of theories of metaphor in philosophy of language, linguistics and
theory of science for the three decades. The purpose of the present paper is
to give reasons not included in the non-comparativist metaphor theories for
the assumption that metaphors, though apparently closely related to simple
predicative similes of the form 'X is like Y', are neither reducible to
similes nor semantically explicable by them because these two tropes, while
expressing different properties of the objects related, i. e., conveying
different semantic contents ('being something' and 'being like something'),
serve different linguistic functions. The special concern of the paper is to
uncover the ambiguous effects of the semantic marker 'like' in both literal
and figurative environments. I will show that irreducible ontological
presuppositions, entailed by the semantic marker of similarity, preclude a
continuous transition from similes to metaphors and require that the
relationship between the two tropes be subverted such that metaphors are to
be viewed as logically antecendent to similes. As a consequence, the
similarity or likeness implication between things, though not irrelevant to
the general understanding of metaphors, is not constitutive of their
linguistic function and their meaning. Instead, metaphors appear to be more
closely related to the structure of literal assertions than to that of
figurative comparisons. 1.
Confusions About Tropes and the Similarity Implication One of the most
discussed traditional assumption about metaphors is that they are elliptical
similes because they, like similes, convey a figuratively expressed
similarity between unrelated objects without, however, using any explicit
semantic marker of similarity. Accordingly, for some authors similes are
figurative comparisons with an explicit semantic marker of likeness (such as
"is like", "similar to", "as", "as
well/many/much/ as" etc.) while metaphors are similes with an implicit
semantic marker. This entails two important points concerning metaphors and
similes: first, that they have the same semantic content despite the use of
different linguistic means, and second, that they belong together due to
their family resemblance which consists in sharing a figurative comparison
while other related tropes, such as comparisons, analogies and models, convey
a literally intended similarity. Although many theorists
of metaphor since the 1954 appearance of Max Black's revolutionary essay
"Metaphor" (Black 1962) have been sceptical of these assumptions,
especially of the latter one concerning similarity as the common linguistic
function of both similes and metaphors, the reasons for this scepticism are
not strong enough to preclude the possibility that similarity or likeness is
in some way involved as a common implication of both tropes. For to imply
likeness between things and, on this basis, a reducibility of similes to
metaphors, and vice versa, is not to assume equality or identity of the
things related, as has been repeatedly asserted.[1] Rather the scepticism about mutual reducibility
between metaphor and simile should be founded upon the fact that metaphors
and similes have a different linguistic form and that, by this very fact, they indicate different
linguistic functions. Adding a semantic marker is not trivial, as has been
claimed against the reductivist theories of metaphor.[2] For, as we intuitively grasp, it is not the
same thing to say that something is something and that something is like something. Moreover, we presume that it is not
only the difference in the grammatical form between those sentences built
upon predications and those containing resemblance indicators which calls
attention to the difference between similes and metaphors, but also that
there must be a different linguistic function and a different logical basis
underlying the predication and comparison markers respectively. Thus confusions about
tropes result as a consequence of non-obvious assumptions about what exactly
is implied in the thesis of mutual reducibility between similes and
metaphors, and the front lines between different authors are anything but
clear. As D. Davidson rightly suggests[3], the conflation of similes and metaphors and
the confusion about the role of similarity in both tropes derive from the
wrong assumption that the "abbreviation" of a simile by a metaphor
implies its reducibility to metaphor. If this were the case, he says, we
could not account for the linguistic difference between the tropes at issue,
but he does not explore or elaborate upon the differences in the linguistic
form which seem indispensable for a just account of metaphor. Nevertheless,
one can add to Davidson's observation that in speaking of mutual reducibility
between metaphors and similes we, as a matter of fact, speak of two opposite
transformation procedures within grammar, i. e., of abbreviation (of similes)
and of extendability (of metaphors). For by adding to a metaphor of the form
"X is (a) Y" the semantic marker of similarity, we extend the
expression grammatically; conversely, by omitting the semantic marker 'like'
in a simile of the form "X is like (a) Y", we simply reduce the
simile grammatically. Traditionally, however, when speaking of reduction, a
semantic reducibility between the tropes is usually intended and not just a
grammatical one. But the very fact that
we are primarily dealing with grammatical ("merely linguistic")
transformations indicates that a further examination of the issue is needed.
For if we say that metaphors are grammatically abbreviated similes and that
similes are grammatically extended metaphors—and we still intend by
this a semantic reducibility—we strongly suggest that (a) the
difference between the two tropes is merely a grammatical one, while (b) their
semantic identity remains untouched by grammatical changes, and (c) the
grammatical interchangeability is only justifiable by virtue of the semantic
identity, and d) the relationship between metaphors and similes is
grammatically and semantically one of symmetry—meaning that every
simile is reducible to the corresponding metaphor and every metaphor is
extendable to its related simile. Obviously, the latter
implication involves the former three and it is exactly this implication
which contradicts our intuition about metaphors and similes. For the
intuition is incompatible with the idea that every metaphor can be extended
and replaced with a (grammatically) corresponding simile without any
significant change. Hence, instead of speaking of reduction, abbreviation,
and extension it seems better to speak, though somewhat vaguely, of
transformation—making room for the possibility that both the
grammatical form and the meaning of the expressions undergo some kind of
complex change. By focusing on the possiblity of transformation, we do not
merely restrict ourselves to a blind intuition about metaphors, but, instead,
we allow for a comprehensive analysis. This means that we (a) acknowledge the
factual, material or grammatical difference between similes and metaphors,
(b) assume that the superficial or material difference in grammatical form is
due to an already existing difference in meaning, i. e., (c) allow that
metaphors and similes are not interchangeable but rather at odds with one
another, and (d) expect that the change in grammar entails a difference in
meaning. In stating this it is,
however, not also asserted that metaphors have no relation to similarity,
upon which all comparison expressions with explicit semantic markers rely.
Rather there is the implication that similes are not immediately reducible to
metaphors and that metaphors are not immediately extendable to similes unless
a semantic shift or change of meaning within an expression is involved.[4] A further source of
confusion about metaphors is the assumption, which, though already discarded,
has still not been sufficiently clarified, namely that all metaphors are not
only grammatically and semantically reducible to similes, but are also
resolvable into literal comparison statements, thereby providing a literal
interpretation of the corresponding simile. This traditional account of
metaphor has been labelled comparativist metaphor theory and rejected by Max
Black (1962). But, as a matter of fact, there is a more moderate
comparativist position, called nonreductive comparativism *(profoundly
criticized by L. Tirrell, cf. Tirrell 1991), which assumes that there is a
continual transition from similes to metaphors, and viceversa, but which does
not maintain that there is an immediate passage from literal comparison
statements to figurative expressions or tropes (Fogelin 1994). The latter
assumption—called "Black's error" (cf. Fogelin 1994)—
about the relationship between figurative tropes such as similes and
metaphors and literal comparison statements cannot, as a matter of fact, be
ascribed even to such traditionalist accounts of metaphor as Aristotle's.
For, as Fogelin correctly assumes, although Aristotle asserts that metaphors
and similes call attention to astonishing likenesses between unrelated
things, and even though he asserts that metaphors belong to similes, he does
not assert that the similarities suggested by similes and metaphors are as
such reducible to comparisons—understood as "already existing
similarities between things" and expressed by literal comparison
statements. Quite on the contrary, Aristotle speaks of "congenial"
and "astonishing" similarities just as modern writers on metaphors
claim for. (*Thus Aristotle, while classifying metaphors as "a kind of
comparison", is, if not creativistic in interpreting metaphors, then at
least vague about the status of "novel" and "insight
providing" metaphors. For as a matter of fact, what he does is
explaining—but not reducing or replacing—metaphors through
similes within the particular, namely epistemological discourse.* 12.1.1997) However, a more
important fact about the history of metaphor theories than Black's error
itself seems to be that no "enemy of metaphor" (Black) has been
able to explain away the notorious rhetorical surplus of this trope as opposed
to its commonly acknowledged cognitive value[5], and no "friend of metaphor" has been
able to eliminate the comparison-based implication of likeness in metaphors
from their linguistic form and, thereby, to radically distinguish metaphors
from similes. This seems to be the reason why different theorists of metaphor
mutually reproach each other with bad comparativism.(*Indurkhya on Black;
Tirrell*) Given this historical
background it is certainly nothing revolutionary to say that the
translatability of metaphors into literal expressions should not be
considered a necessary consequence of the apparently very close grammatical
and semantic relationship between metaphors and similes ("figurative
comparisons"). Nor should it be startling to maintain that the similarity
implication we feel to be essential to metaphors does not necessarily entail
the semantic reducibility of metaphoric expressions to statements of
similarity. But it is certainly a small revolution within theory to say, as
Davidson does, that metaphors begin with and live from nothing but the
literal meaning of words. There seems to be reason enough to take this idea
for a crucial point about metaphors without being obligated to accept several
other assumptions of Davidson's which are central to his position. Indeed, Davidson's
thesis is unique in the sense that it, contrary to excessive metaphor
theories, gives metaphors as small a semantic credit as possible while
leaving room for as great a meaning-effect as possible. If we, along with
many authors, attempt to explain novel metaphors as conveyers of new
similarity aspects (Black), cognitive contents (Indurkhya) and also of new
linguistic meaning (Kittay), then we must, as I believe, begin with
Davidson's general thesis that there is no metaphoric meaning of words apart
of their literal meaning, *and this means more precisely: antecendent to
their usage in a metaphoric framework*. For what is authentically novel in a
language is itself already post-metaphorical; *the label "metaphoric"
in dictionary entries indicates what has been called "dead" or
unfresh metaphors*. So language can only be creative of meanings and
cognitive contents on the basis of metaphoric procedures *regardless of the
ultimate status of the literal language itself, i. e. of how it
"fits" with reality*. Metaphors occur only within, and by means of,
the literal language. In other words, metaphors seem to be possible in a
language only if "everything" in language is not already a
metaphor, *though the language itself might rely upon a
"metaphoric" conceptual apparatus (Lakoff/Johnson 1981)*. If this is true of
language and metaphors, then any account of how these tropes "work"
(Black), how they arise in language, must entail an account of literal
linguistic procedures or, at least, be related to such an account (Kittay
1987; also Haack 1994). In the following sections I will not be primarly
concerned with questions as to how particular metaphors function or what
their general linguistic structure is like.[6] Rather, the concern of the present analysis
will be to examine as exactly as possible the general relationship between
metaphors and similes—since they represent the figurative trope most
closely related to metaphors—and to open up a perspective for viewing
the conditions necessary to an understanding of metaphor as the most
fundamental of tropes. For, as I believe, only on the basis of such an
understanding will it be possible to acknowledge the full semantic,
aesthetic, and cognitive range of metaphors which so deeply concerns different
researchers investigating the role of metaphors in philosophy and science.[7] 2.
Passing under the "Rainbow": Literal Comparisons, the 'Like', and
Metaphors The conventional way of
treating metaphors and similes proceeds by remarking that if we compare a
metaphor to the corresponding simile we see that the former trope appears to
be in some way stronger than the latter one. Thus in sentences like "He
is a wolf" or, as Shakespeare's Romeo expresses himself, "Juliet is
the sun" we intuitively grasp that these sentences are, in form and
content, "stronger" or more expressive than "He is like a
wolf" or "Juliet is like the sun". Typically, the word
"stronger" means a difference in the strength of assertion, or, as
Tirrell says, in the assertional commitment to what is said.[8] However, the
assertional commitment to what is said by metaphors and similes seems to
depend on different types of predication and, hence, cannot be a matter of
mere subjective commitment. Therefore, the gradual difference in the strength
of assertion, if there is any, should also be understood as an effect of
different types of assertion, though the psychological effect of assertions on hearers may be a matter of
gradual difference in the sense that we consider (or feel) it as "stronger"
to say "X is Y" than "X is like Y". Nevertheless it does
not seem justified, on the basis of such a psychological effect, to take the
difference in assertion types between "X is Y" and "X is like
Y" for a difference in "the strength of commitment". When this
is done, different linguistic levels are conflated,
those of the grammatical forms of predication and their respective functions.
To say "X is like Y" is not merely to use a "weaker" predication form than "X is Y", but to use a
different type of assertion, which can or may, if compared to the predication
form "X is Y", effectuate either a weaker assertion commitment to what is said by the speaker or a weaker
effect on the audience. Therefore, instead of reducing the difference in
grammatical forms of assertion (predication vs. comparison) into
one—presumingly identical—linguistic function, we should assume
that the differences between metaphors and similes are twofold: they are
different both in grammatical type and, consequently, in assertional commitment.
But the latter is secondary to and dependent on the difference in the
grammatical type of assertion.[9] In saying this, nothing
more or new has been asserted of metaphors and similes than would not hold of
literal assertions and comparison statements. We encounter the same
difference in the type of predication in assertions such as the following
ones: 1(a):
He is a preacher. 1(b): He is like a
preacher. 1(c): He looks like a
preacher. 1(d): He talks like a
preacher preaches. ———————————————— 1(n): (X + verb phrase +
like a Y) In dealing with
assertions of this kind we recognize at once that, in spite of their literal
appearance, they are ambiguous in several respects. First of all, the sample
1(a) can be interpreted both as a literal statement or as a metaphor,
depending on whether the person of which it is said is really a preacher or
not, and it would not contribute to the understanding of such a context-free
sentence if we replaced the personal pronoun "he", an indexical
term, with a proper name (e.g. "John") or with a referring
expression (e.g. "this man", "this person"). But
regardless of this ambiguity, which is context-dependent, another kind of
ambiguity makes itself noticeable when we compare the samples listed above.
While it is not clear whether the sample 1(a), when taken in isolation, is a
literal assertion about one person being a preacher or, possibly, an example
of figurative assertion about the same person which relates her to a preacher
implying that she might not be, other samples containing the semantic marker
'like' state clearly—and independently of any context—that the
person referred to by the pronoun "he" is not a preacher. As we shall see later on, in the
figurative context the implications will be diametrically opposed. Thus we are able to
observe an intriguing effect of the semantic marker 'like' which is neither
identical nor reducible to its linguistic function (comparison between two
unrelated or different things). Namely, while in samples 1(b-d) the semantic
marker 'like' disambiguates
the context-dependent ambiguity in 1(a), it provides at the same time—by being a common
element of 1(b-d)—a discursive context for 1(a) to be interpreted metaphorically. For
we may inverse the order of the assertions which results in the order 1(d—>a)
instead of 1(a—>d), so that, instead of the initial poly-univocity
(i. e., sets of different, but univocal senses, either literal or metaphoric
or even both ) we are now confronted with a kind of uni-equivocity: the
inverted sample order has the effect of unambiguously establishing the
metaphoric character of assertion 1(a), thus allowing for further grammatical
transformations and, accordingly, for further assertion procedures such as
the one indicated by 1(n) in the figure below: 1(d):
He talks like a preacher preaches. 1(c): He looks like a
preacher. 1(b): He is like a
preacher. 1(a): He is a preacher. __________________________________ 1(n): This preacher
(...) But the intriguing and
peculiar difference in the effect of the semantic marker 'like' on the sample
1(a), which contains the simple form of predication ("is /a/ Y"),
will become more obvious if we examine the following samples of figurative
speech: 2(a):
Juliet is the sun. 2(b): Juliet is like the
sun. 2(c): Juliet smiles as
the sun shines. —————————————— 2(n): X + verb phrase +
as + Y + verb phrase It is notorious that
parallel relations exist between metaphors, similes, literal assertions and
comparison statements: metaphors relate to literal statements by sharing the
same kind of predication (cf. 2(a)=Juliet is the sun :: 1(a)=He is a
preacher), and similes relate to comparison statements by sharing the
explicit semantic marker of similarity (2(b)=Juliet is like the sun ::
1(b)=He is like a preacher). On the other hand, metaphors relate to similes
on the ground that they are both figurative expressions, while comparisons
relate to literal assertions on the ground that both are literal forms of
assertion. This proportional analogy between tropes and literal forms of
comparison and assertion can be explained in as many ways as there are
respects in which the predication can be analyzed (identification,
attribution, existence) and in which semantic markers of similarity can be
listed (is like, like, as, as much as, as many as, similar to etc.).[10] However, a third
analogy relation between the four elements is not proportional. Contrary to
comparisons, metaphors do not contain a semantic marker but are figurative;
on the other hand, similes, contrary to literal assertions, require an
explicit semantic marker and yet are figurative. Hence, there seems to be no
proportional relation and no passage from similes to literal assertions, or vice versa and, equally, no passage from
metaphors to literal comparisons,
or vice versa. But there seems to be a peculiar—and quite
different—aspect in which the function of the semantic marker 'like'
could be analyzed, and this is precisely the one we have observed in the
samples 1(d->a) which showed the condition required to establish a
passage from literal comparisons to metaphors. It is an effect of the semantic marker itself
which makes the literal assertion, such as 1(a), a figurative expression.
Hence, the disproportional relation between literal comparisons and metaphors
turns out to be a relation of consistency. For we have until now been able to
observe that the semantic marker 'like' has had the peculiarity of
disambiguating the context-dependence of literal expressions. Regardless of
our knowledge about the person referred to by the indexical term
"he" in sentence 1(a), it became—by introducing the semantic
marker 'like' and thereby extending 1(a) to 1(b)—unambiguously clear
that the person in 1(a) was not a preacher. But it also became unambiguously
clear that, given 1(d—>b), the expression 1(a) had to be a sample of
metaphoric speech or, at least, a trope-like assertion which loses its
context-dependent ambiguity by exchanging it for a semantic one. My suggestion so far is
that assertions like 1(a)(=He is a preacher) are—unlike assertions such
as 2(a)(=Juliet is the sun), where general knowledge or dictionary and
encyclopedia entries provide sufficient conditions for
understanding—literal assertions which depend on the context in which
they are stated or applied to a person. Contrary to this, we have seen that
by virtue of the discursive context which is provided by assertions
1(d—>b) with the semantic marker 'like', the assertion 1(a),
supposedly literal, was revealed to be metaphoric. But at this point the question
may arise whether it is sufficient for a literal expression such as "He
is a preacher" to be interpreted metaphorically if we are sure that the
content asserted (being a preacher) is not the case and that the assertion
itself is not due to a false statement or a lie. In other words, the question
is: What enables us to speak of the person referred to by "he" in
such a way that literal assertions about this person 1(b—>d) allow
for a passage to a wholly different form of predication (copula + noun phrase
in 1(a)) and, moreover, for the introduction of a completely different
referring expression (cf. the attributive term: "This preacher" in
1(n), instead of "He"). To put it more generally, what enables a
literal expression to become metaphoric, to refer and to have a reliable
meaning? An answer to this question may be approached by reconsidering the
role of the "literal" semantic marker within a broader pragmatic
framework and by relating our understanding of this role to expressions which
may be considered as univocally metaphoric, such as 2(a)=Juliet is the sun. The effect of the
semantic marker 'like' in metaphoric utterences, if related to corresponding
similes, seems not to be the same as in literal assertions when related to
comparison statements. If we reconsider the relationship between metaphoric
expressions and similes as in 2(a-c), then we see that there is no passage
from comparison statements 1(d—>b) to the literal statement 1(a)
unless the subject referred to, or the truth conditions of the sentence, change.
This means: a passage from 1(d—>b) to 1(a), is not possible without
a change of reference on the side of the subject referred to, or a change of
knowledge conditions on the side of the speaker. Thus, if we say of a person
that "He is like a preacher" we cannot pass over to the statement
"He is a preacher", and mean it literally, unless we refer to
another person or somebody else augments our knowledge of the former person
by saying "But he is a preacher". Hence, we may assume that the
semantic marker of similarity in literal comparison statements, while
indicating that "is Y" is not the case, allows for the possiblility that "X is Y" be the case. But this
possibility, to be real, necessarily requires a change of purely linguistic truth conditions into historic
context conditions. If "is Y" is the case, then the literal
sentences "is like Y" change their assertional status from literal
comparisons into hyperbolic or emphatic expressions. With this background we
can assume that the semantic marker 'like', while disambiguating the
context-dependent ambiguity of literal statements such as 1(a) (="He is
a preacher"), and introducing a meaning related pluri-monosemy, which is
represented by sentences 1(b-d), has the effect of preventing a straightforward
passage from literal comparison statements to literal assertions, and vice
versa, if the subject of reference remains identical. This means that the
introduction of the semantic marker into literal discourse brings about a
change of truth conditions, such that, while applying "X is Y" and
"X is like Y" to the same subject, we either accept that the
subject of reference must be different each time or we replace one type of
predication with another and take into account that our assertional commitment
cannot be the same in both cases ("knowing that" vs. "feeling
that"). Only in this case can we, as I believe, comprehensively speak of
a gradual difference in the assertional commitment to what is said.[11] But this assumption also touches upon literal
statements and literal comparisons if it is expected that each of them relate
to the same subject of reference. Thus, on the one hand, we say of a person
that he/she is like a preacher only on the condition that we do not know
about his/her really being a preacher; on the other hand, if we know that
he/she is a preacher we normally do not use comparison statements containing
the semantic marker of similarity to refer to the same person except in order
to emphasize our assertion. Thus we may say: "He is (or: He may be) a
preacher, but he also is (looks, behaves, talks etc.) like one". In that
case, however, we extend the discourse by experimenting with its truth
conditions, and, as a matter of fact, we intend to say something different of
the person referred to: not only that he/she is a preacher, but that he/she
is like a preacher, meaning that he/she is a prototype of the preacher.
Although this latter possibility is semantically closely related to sentences
like 1(a) and to comparison statements 1(b—>d), this meaning is nevertheless
an effect of a different type of assertion, combining two gradually (cf.
"not only, but", "moreover" etc.) ordered types of
predication (assertion vs. comparison statement). But in such samples of
hyperbolic stylisation of the asserting procedure, a possible extension of
the discourse may by provided by a conversational reply: "A preacher is
a preacher, so every preacher is like a preacher". In this way we weaken
the assertional commitment of the hyperbolic (doubled) predication form "is and is like",
by indicating that "is" entails "is like", such that
being a preacher entails some similarity to the commonly assumed properties
of being a preacher (be they related to appearance, behavior or psychology). But at this point we
realize that not every preacher-like person is a preacher. If it is not
apparent that the referent is a preacher, we cannot, on the ground of literal
comparison procedure (cf. "He is like a preacher"), make the literal
and true statement "He
is a preacher". Given these conditions we can only make an uncertain
statement that may be true or may be false. Hence we can plausibly assume
that the semantic marker 'like', if added to a literal statement, produces
two complex effects: first, it disambiguates the contextual ambiguity of assertions
but with the result of literalizing or, more precisely, providing literal
truth conditions for comparison statements (in the sense that "being
like a preacher" is equivalent to having some aspects in common with a
preacher); second, it provides the necessary condition for the initial
literal statements to be metaphorical. The condition consists in this: the
semantic marker 'like', though relating to the same subject of reference as
the simple predication form "is", disconnects the initial literal
statement 'X is Y' from the ontological presupposition; namely, that the
subject of reference actually is that which is predicated of the subject. In
this respect we can say that there is no straightforward transition from
literal comparisons to literal assertions. As we have seen, this effect of
the semantic marker 'like' is context-independent: if we say of a person that
she is like Y, we presuppose that she is not Y, irrespective of whether she actually is or possibly may be.
And it is just this presupposition which provides the necessary precondition
for the corresponding literal assertion 'X is Y' to be interpretable as a
metaphoric expression.[12] Thus we may generally assume that, in a literal
environment, the semantic marker of similarity will play the role of both literalizer—providing that comparison statements
remain literal—and metaphorizer—providing that the place of the
corresponding literal assertion is occupied by a metaphor candidate. 3. The
Double Role of the Semantic Marker and the Likeness-Implication in Metaphors If this is true, we
have, in a metaphorical environment, quite a different situation with respect
to the role of the semantic marker of similarity. While passing from the
metaphoric expression 2(a) to the corresponding simile-versions 2(b—>c),
there is no oddity comparable to the literal environment: in saying 2(a)
"Juliet is the sun" we do not find anything unsound with respect
either to the status of the subject of reference in statements such as 2(b)
"Juliet is like the sun", or to the veritative status of attributes
predicated of the subject, for "Juliet" remains the same in 2(a)
and 2(b). The above statement can
be better approached by analyzing the relationship between the simple
predication simile and corresponding similes which carry grammatical and
lexical transformations of the predication form "is like" through
other verb or noun phrases. To proceed, let us reconsider the simple simile
form of the much exploited metaphor by Shakespeare cited above as 2(a)
"Juliet is the sun". It is not an isolated metaphoric expression
but part of a discursive context which allows for more precise interpretation
of the metaphor than would be possible if it were an isolated sentence. In
the corresponding verses of Shakespeare's masterpiece, Romeo says: "Ah,
what light through yonder window breaks, It is the East, and
Juliet is the sun". Thus, before
introducing the Juliet-metaphor, the poet first refers to the morning light
breaking through the window of Juliet's room, calling it "the
East". It is precisely the fact that metaphors are embedded in a
framework containing other metaphors and related to other metaphors (and
similes) in order to build a broader metaphorical discourse, that is decisive
in accounting for the specific linguistic function of a particular metaphor.
But, for the purpose of the present analysis, we can focus on the
corresponding simple predicative simile which, as a matter of fact,
Shakespeare did not use. If he had, then it would have been the one of the
form "Juliet
is like the sun" [= 2(b)], and we would have,
among other hermeneutic tasks, to interpret the respect in which Shakespeare
intended the likeness between Juliet and the sun. However, what is decisive
from the standpoint of a formal analysis is not primarly whether we succeed
in interpreting the non-Shakespearean simile by restating the similarity the
poet might have had in mind or by listing all possible aspects which could
account for such a simile irrespective of historical or cultural conditions.
Rather, of far greater importance is whether we understand the grammatical
form and the lingustic function of the simile, since the
necessary—though not sufficient—precondition for interpreting the
simile in as many different ways as possible is that we are able to maintain the same grammatical form and linguistic
function of the semantic marker. Or, to put it more precisely, we are allowed
to interpret a particular simile under the condition that we have understood
its grammatical form and its linguistic function (which is, its peculiar role
in our grasping "the world"). If we have done so, then we
may—and we actually do—interpret the figurative speech sample
independently of the respective author's intentions. And it is only due to
this condition that we are able either to search for aspects of likeness
which purport to be historically intended or to feel justified in neglecting
the historical question as to what Shakespeare's (or any author's) subjective
intentions might have been.[13] Hence, the above-cited
simile may be comprehensively supplemented by further versions preserving its
grammatical form: 2(b)
Juliet is like the sun. 2(b)-1: Juliet is warm
like a sunny day. 2(b)-2: Juliet's face is
brillant like the sun-shine (in the morning). 2(b)-3: Juliet's hair is
like the sun's rays falling etc. ____________________________________ 2(b)-n: (Juliet's +
np + is like + np + etc.) What is striking in the
examples listed above is that the subject of reference, Juliet, is given
literal properties (warm, shining) or literally attributed substantives
(physical world items: rays, sunny day) of the sun but not figurative ones.[14] Thus we see that what makes the properties of
the sun figurative is only their being attributed to Juliet who is a young
female human being and not an asteroid. In this respect one can say that the
simile expressing a figuratively intended comparison—this means:
embedded in a metaphorical framework of predication (Juliet vs. the
sun)—relies on literally comprehended properties or attributes of the sun.
In saying this we should not be concerned with questions as to whether
comparison and likeness statements really imply all literally predicated properties of the Y-element in the simile: they clearly do
not, for to say of Juliet that she "is (like) the sun", does not
and cannot, in the given discursive context (a tragedy), imply in any way
that she is imagined as an immense burning asteroid or that she is positioned
far away in outer space. Admittedly, such implications are not precluded both
from the perspective of the speaker and of the listener, but if they were to
appear in the given discursive context, they would necessarily cause a change
in character of the discourse itself (e.g., transforming the tragedy in part
or as a whole to another genre).[15] As we know, such subversive implications are
allowed and even integrated in comedies, parodies and in speech samples based
on everyday language use. This means that every competent speaker of a
language can make such subversive implications and build a correspondingly subversive
(or deconstructivist) discourse. But what is important in such procedures is
that we, by subverting the discourse, wittingly prove that we have understood
the figurative speech sample: for we know which implications of a figurative
expression are precluded by the given context just as we know the same for
the literal environment. Thus it is just this fact which justifies the
assumption that—although we are not obliged to take into account all
actual properties of an Y-element of the predication or all possible
ones—all the properties of Y we actually do apply to the X-element of
the figurative expression are literal. The precondition for this is, of
course, that all properties at issue are properties of or properties
attributed to Y, for it is in no way precluded that X be given properties of
Y that are figuratively attributed to it (indicated below as *F). Hence, we
may say: 2(b)-n1:
Juliet is like the smiling sun. 2(b)-n2: Juliet's
burning arms are like the sun's rays eager to embrace the earth. ____________________________________________________ 2(b)-nn: (Juliet's +
np*F + is like + np*F + vp*F etc.) These samples do not
contradict the assumption that in similes the predication procedure relies
upon applying literal properties of Y to X. They are more complex similes,
built upon other tropes which can be resolved by analyzing the properties
figuratively applied either to Y ("the sun's rays eager to
embrace") or to X ("burning arms"), if there are any. But what
is intriguing in all these examples is not whether the particular properties
of Y, applied to X, are literal or figurative. For, whether literal or
figurative, the intrinsic property of the simile as a figurative comparison
is retained because of the character of the terms related ('Juliet' vs. 'the
sun'). Moreover, it is clear that figurative properties of Y may be taken
from X itself (as in 2(b)-1: "smiling sun"), from other contexts
such as mythology, or from other objects in the world. Hence, what we may
assume as strikingly true of similes is that it is not primarily the
figurative character of properties of the Y-element that constitute their
figurative status; much less trivial of similes is that they, as examples of
comparison operating on properties of unrelated things, accomplish, by their
very grammatical form, a literalization of the predication procedure which indicates a particular similarity relation between X and Y. Or, to put
it more clearly, it is not the property of the sun as being a burning (hence:
hot and bright, warm and shining) asteroid which is equated with any
intrinsic property of Juliet as a female and a young human being. It is
exactly the semantic marker installing a similarity relation between two
discrete items in the world which generates the equation. Whatever the
properties of Y are like in character, their linguistic application to X is
performed and governed by the semantic marker of similarity. In other words,
the only visible linguistic factor to define the character of the expression
and to enable that unrelated things like Juliet and the sun be related to
each other is the comparison marker itself, which represents, of course, the
linguistic function of comparison intended by the speaker. But, as we know,
the sematnic marker of "comparison" is capable of connecting and
relating quite unrelated things. Hence in reading "X is like Y" we
can only read that "X is like Y" and not that "X is Y".
But the precondition for us to grasp that one particular expression
establishes a comparison or defines a similarity relation between X and Y,
and not an identification or any other linguistic function, is to grasp the
grammatical form of the expression.[16] But, as we know, this
grammatical form is common to simile as well as to literal comparisons, which
implies that it is not specific to similes and not by itself able to reveal a
difference between similes and comparisons (cf. Tirrell 1991). This finding
is nevertheless everything but trivial. We have enough reason to believe that
the intriguing question about similes is not whether the properties
attributed to the X-element are literal or figurative properties of the
Y-element, but rather what the effect of relating X and Y via the semantic
marker of similarity is. In the same way that the literal environment,
presented above, was examined with the help of comparison statements 1(b-d),
we shall look at the function of the semantic marker in the simile with
respect to the corresponding metaphor. For we know, at least by intuition,
that relating the properties of one item of the world to another does not by
itself cause any striking difficulty in our understanding of the world. This
is due to the fact that our conceptual apparatus itself is built upon
metaphoric patterns so that we relate to abstract objects in the way we relate
to physical objects: thus we "come" to ideas and we
"approach" problems.[17] In this respect figurative similes and genuine
metaphoric expressions do not essentially differ. This continual passage from
"related" to "distantly related" and "not
related" things is not, as I have suggested, due to the properties of Y
which are attributed to X, but seems to be an effect of the peculiar function
of the semantic marker. The statement that a
girl "is the sun" does not convey anything unsound with respect to
the statement 2(b) "Juliet is like the sun", provided that we have
contextual knowledge enabling us to understand and process the personal
pronouns and proper names into referring terms, and vice versa. More
precisely, what we observe while passing from metaphors to similes, is that
the sameness of both the referent and the attribute predicated of it, despite
the transition in tropes, results from the fact that here the semantic marker
'like' has no bearing on the ontological status of the referent's being Y. Juliet's
"being the sun" and her "being like the sun" are,
according to our present knowledge of the world, equally impossible.
Accordingly, we cannot say that it is the semantic marker 'like' in similes
2(b-c) which by itself makes the expression 2(a) metaphorical, as was the
case in literal comparisons such as "He is like a preacher".
Nonetheless, the similes are, unlike metaphors, essentially constituted by
the presence of an explicit semantic marker, just like comparative
statements, and what we observe now is that the semantic marker 'like' turns
out to be wholly irrelevant for an expression to be considered figurative,
whether it is a simile or a metaphor. Hence, the genuinely metaphoric status
of an expression such as 2(a)=Juliet is the sun, unlike the ambiguously
literal one (1(a)=He is a preacher), appears wholly independent of any
possible relationship to a corresponding simile, although the related simile
may, or actually does, contain the same elements as the corresponding
metaphor, such that the metaphor 2(a) "Juliet is the sun" has the
appearance of being identical with the simile 2(b) "Juliet is like the
sun", except that it contains an additional grammatical element. On this basis we can
conclude that since similes are necessarily but not exclusively constituted
by the presence of an explicit semantic marker, they are formally related to
comparative statements and not to metaphors. If we remember that metaphoric
expressions behave grammatically in the same way as literal statements
do—they contain the same pattern of predication and allow for the same
transformation of predicates into attributes[18]—we see that the proportional analogy
between tropes, mentioned above, holds also in another respect, namely that
metaphors relate to literal assertions in the same way similes relate to
comparison statements, a reason for this being that they belong to different
modes of predication.[19] Thus, while it is obvious that similes
necessarily contain an explicit semantic marker of similarity just as
comparison statements do, one must pay full attention to the fact that
corresponding metaphors share the same grammatical form with literal
assertions and not with figurative similes. But by occupying opposite places
in the positions layed down by the analogy symbol (::), there arise further
serious consequences for the conventional wisdom concerning the relation of
metaphor to simile. 4.
Beyond the 'Like': Metaphors unlike Similes What has been
established thus far is that it is not constitutive of metaphors to be
reducible to similes but, instead, to share the same grammatical forms of
assertion with literal ones. This, however, does not imply that metaphors and
similes are wholly unrelated. Rather it suggests that their relationship is
different than has usually been assumed. So far the ground has been prepared
for the notion that the semantic marker of similarity, although constitutive
of similes, is not only inessential to the figurative character of tropes,
but—being essential to the linguistic function of comparison—grammatically
and semantically at odds with the predication form of metaphors. This implies
that, at least in some contexts, the use of the semantic marker might block
the formation of metaphors, and vice versa. In order to approach
these aspects of metaphor we may state that, in contrast to the literal
assertion 1(a)=He is a preacher, samples of the simile 2(b-c) provide no
discursive context for the corresponding metaphor 2(a)=Juliet is the sun. In
other words, a statement such as "Juliet is like the sun"
contributes nothing either to the referential, or veridical status, or to the
understandability of the metaphorical statement "Juliet is the
sun". If it did, then we would have to presuppose that the former
sentence is a more comprehensive version of the latter one. But we are not
told in which respect Juliet is like the sun, and we surely do not feel much more
comfortable with the content of this statement than with the content of the
metaphor itself. But even if it were the case that simple similes are more
comprehensible than metaphors—and it is clearly not, as Fogelin (1994)
and Indurkhya (1992) correctly assume—the only reason for this greater
comprehensiblity of the simple (and abstract!) simile would be our
understanding of the linguistic function of the semantic marker itself, for
it constitutes the only overt difference between similes and metaphors.[20] But despite such a
close relation between metaphors and similes, a relation which tempts us to assume
that similes are metaphors plus the 'like', we hold that, though we are not
told in what respect X is like Y, we are—by the very grammatical
form of the
simile—given discourse-related information, namely that X and Y are related to one another
by virtue of the assumption that they are alike. This obviates the
assumption, told us by the corresponding metaphor, that they are identical.
Thus we have several important elements for further analysis: first, what is informative or content-providing in both the metaphor and
the corresponding simile is only their respective grammatical form; this form is either that of predication (X is Y), on the one hand, or that of a similarity
statement (X is like Y),
on the other. Second, what the similarity marker aims at is not to indicate
the particular is-relation between X and Y (be it similarity, identity,
partial identity), but rather to specify the aspects of the similarity
relation itself, i. e., aspects of likeness, that do pertain between X and Y
in the given simile. Hence, third, the similarity marker in a simple
predicative simile establishes and guarantees only the similarity relation
itself and requires that instantiations of it be displayed by pointing out
particular properties of Y. Thus, even when confronted with a radically
unusual simile, we either accept the "likeness" intuitively or we
searche for aspects of "likeness" between unrelated things, i. e.,
we reflect upon the likeness suggested by the simile. On the basis of this,
fourth, the simple predicative or metaphor-like simile, purporting to rely
upon a simple extension of the predicative metaphor ("is like" for
"is"), is nonetheless clearly directed towards other related (or
derived) examples of simile and not to the "corresponding"
metaphor. In other words, what the predicate phrase "is like Y" in
a simile seems to suggest is either that "is" ought to be replaced
with a more appropriate verb phrase or that Y should be replaced with a more
appropriate noun phrase. The semantic marker in a simple predicative simile
requires, for its comprehension, pointing out aspects of likeness such as the
ones given in 2(b-c). Thus, fifth, since the copula in "is like"
stands for another finite verb to describe one particular aspect of
similarity between X and Y ('being like' instead of 'looking like', 'walking
like', 'eating like'), it seems possible to assume that the simple
predicative simile, containing only the copula 'is' and thus conveying a
quite abstract or unspecified content, appears to be the reduction or ellipsis
of corresponding extended similes.[21] But this is precisely what cannot be said of
the "corresponding" metaphor because the copula 'is' is not an
ellipsis of 'is like' for the simple reason that it performs a different
linguistic function than comparison, and 'is like' is, by virtue of its
linguistic function, related to corresponding semantic markers of similarity
such as "similar to", "as" etc. Contrary to this, in
metaphors things are not compared but related to one another by predication,
identified with or subordinated to one another, and replaced or represented
by one another. It thus becomes obvious
that the gap between similes and metaphors cannot be compared to the gap
existing between a comparison statement and the corresponding literal assertion.
The passage from a simile to the corresponding metaphor in no way changes the
referential status of the subject or the veridical value of the statement
itself. What has been demonstrated is rather the opposite, namely, that
metaphors provide a discursive context for similes such that the semantic
marker of similarity, if added to a genuine metaphor, causes, first, a change
in linguistic function between metaphor and simile (predication vs.
comparison) and thereby, second, a change within the figurative status of the
comparison trope: while metaphors live from oddity
("figurativeness"), similes—assumed to be
figurative—reveal themselves as examples of a literally intended linguistic function of comparison irrespective of the figurative status of properties
of Y attributed to X. For, as we have seen in 2(b-c) and 2(b):1-n, it is not
that properties of the sun—be they literal, figurative, or
combined—are taken as properties or "real attributes" of
Juliet, but that they are applied to Juliet via
the similarity marker. In other words, the only element taken as literal
is the linguistic function of the semantic marker itself, i. e. the
comparison. This
entails—apparently contrary to our assumptions so far—that,
third, if the simple is-predication in metaphoric expressions is given a
similarity marker, a change in the ontological status of the referent X in
the sense of "being possibly the case" must be the the effect:
namely, while in metaphors we know that 'X is Y' is not the case, in similes
we accept or deny the possibility that X may be like Y. This means that metaphors and similes entail
respectively different ontological presuppositions ('is not Y' vs. 'is like Y
possibly') and, consequently, that their relationship should be redescribed
by different systematic means than the similarity assumption. In this respect the
semantic marker used in similes plays just the opposite role that it does in
the literal environment: it transposes the asserted figurative is-relation
between X and Y, processed exclusively by the predicative linguistic function
of metaphor, into the literal function of comparison. Therefore it is
possible to state that metaphors are antecendent
to similes because they
provide the necessary onto-logical condition for figuratively ascribing likeness
or similarity to unlike things. We know that Juliet is not the sun, and this
knowledge is what makes metaphors possible as well as generally
comprehensible. We accept that she, though being totally different, may be
like the sun, just because
a certain relation between Juliet and the sun has already been processed
through the metaphor. Hence, the only element capable of
"comparing" the properties of unrelated things is the semantic
marker itself, which keeps a place open for selecting ever new aspects of
"likeness". It gives the necessary linguistic framework for
"untenable" comparisons, but it neither constitutes the metaphor,
nor compels its comprehension, since no like-relation or property can itself
be the bridge for passing on to an is-predication of the corresponding
metaphor. This holds true in the literal environment because, as we have
seen, the like-relation in "X is like Y" indicates that "X is
(a) Y" is not or possibly not the case. In the metaphoric environment the same holds but for
quite opposite reasons: it is the presupposition of not being the case,
introduced by the corresponding metaphor, which permits similarity relation
to be asserted at all, i. e., which permits that the impossible is-relation
of the metaphor becomes the possibly true like-relation of the simile. 5.
Metaphors : Filling the Gap with Chasm The subverted relation
between metaphors and similes, as indicated above, becomes more transparent
if we remember that similes such as 2(b-c) and 2(b):1-n, if read in the
reverse order, do not bring about the linguistic status of the expression
2(a), as was true of 1(d—>a). If similes were the way to pass on to
metaphors, it would at some point be possible for the metaphoric expression
2(a)="Juliet is the sun" to turn out to be a literal expression.
For, if some day enough intrinsic properties of the sun could be attributed
to Juliet, it would arouse our suspicion about the referential relation of
the proper name "Juliet", and make us wonder whether it might not
actually designate an asteroid rather than a young female human being. But,
as has become clear, exactly the opposite is the case: it is the conjunction
of two unrelated items of the world, themselves conjoined only by means of
the grammatical form of predication, that governs the attribution of
"properties" of the one to the other. If Juliet is like the sun, we
assume—just as in the literal context—that she is not the sun and
that she may be the sun only under the condition that "Juliet" refers
to an asteroid. In this case the similes would change the referential status
of the expression, assumed to be metaphoric, into a literal one. But this is impossible
by the very fact that—contrary to literal environments such as 1(a-d)
where it is not ruled out that "he" may indeed be a preacher—a
young female human being cannot be an asteroid. As a consequence, we cannot
explain the passage from the predicative simile "X is like Y" to
the predicative metaphor "X is Y", because in proceeding from
similes to the "corresponding" metaphor we only better understand
and describe the "similarity" assumed to hold between X and Y, but
we do not arrive at the metaphor itself. In other words, additional (more
concrete and more comprehensible) similes only represent and
explain—under different and more concrete aspects—the similarity relation which is stated by the simple (and abstract)
predicative simile, but they do not allow for a passage to the metaphor
itself. Rather it is the metaphor which governs and limits the domain of
permissible properties of likeness by simply imposing a relation between
X-elements and Y-elements. On the basis of this
discussion we may restate that, within the figurative environment, the
formation of discursive comprehensibility conditions proceeds in the opposite
direction when compared with the literal environment. This means that similes
do not provide a discursive context for understanding the status of the
corresponding metaphor as comparison statements do for the corresponding
literal statement. While extending the similarity aspects through more
concrete similes we only attain a better, more elaborate understanding of the
similarity relation, but we do not pass from "is like" to
"is", i. e., we do not translate the linguistic function of simile
into the linguistic function of metaphor. Therefore there is no reason to
believe that the linguistic status of metaphor depends in any way on how well
or poorly we may understand a simile. If the linguistic status did depend on
such an understanding, then metaphor would be either a candidate for the
ascription of truth or falsity,[22] or it would require another form of discourse
to become plausible (such as tales and myths), or other worlds for it to
become possible.[23] Hence we recognize that the precondition which
allows the creation and the comprehension of metaphors, in spite of their
semantic oddity, is the ontological presupposition of their not being the
case. The means a metaphor uses to show up this impossibility is nothing
other than the linguistic function of predication, which it shares with the
literal discourse. Accordingly, the comprehensibility which relies on the
possibility that a likeness-relation pertains between X and Y is not
necessary for a metaphor to be a metaphor. It is, quite to the contrary, the
"untenable" form or the linguistic framework which is
necessary—though not sufficient—for metaphors to be
linguistically possible and comprehensible. This entails that metaphors are
dependent on other truth conditions (if there are any for metaphors) and on
other linguistic function (if there is a particular "metaphorical"
one). In assuming this,
however, nothing has been said about the ultimate status of the similarity
implication in metaphors. We have only implied that similarity must relate to
the comprehensibility and the acceptability of metaphors in a different way
than it does in the case of similes. The usual explanation of this problem,
characteristic of nonreductive simile theories of metaphor, is to say that,
while similes contain an explicit marker of likeness, metaphors rely upon the
implication of likeness,
whereby it is not necessary to assume that likeness or similarity can explain
the whole meaning of the metaphor; the implication of likeness is considered
to provide only the necessary cognitive background ("semantic
memory" or "knowledge of world") for understanding metaphors,
since metaphors impose, like all new information and knowledge, apperceptive
problems on the cognitive process of human beings (cf. Miller 1979). If
related to our account as presented so far, this explanation seems to say
that instead of being a constitutive element of the grammatical structure as
in the case of similes, similarity delimits the horizon in which cognitive
judgements and psychological expectations concerning the meaning of metaphor
are formed. Thus, the similarity assumption, by exchanging the presence—given by the very grammatical structure
of the simile—for absence—the condition of all metaphors—transforms the
ontological status of metaphor from "non-being" to "being".
This transformation is the consequence of the linguistic function performed
by the particle 'like'. By thus founding similes as well as metaphors on the
similarity implication, all comparativist accounts of metaphor, whether
reductive or not, must make use of the operator of existence (cf. Miller). But this is
fundamentally misleading. Not because metaphors are absolutely unrelated to
the similarity implication or to cognitive processes, both of which are based
on apperceptive processes; but only because the ontological presupposition of
"not being the case" is the precondition of producing,
understanding, and accepting metaphors just as the ontological presupposition
of "being the case" is the precondition of forming and accepting
literal assertions. If we remember that there are, as a matter of fact, no
similarities between an asteroid and a female human being to be common
properties of the sun and Juliet—for if there were even one single
material similarity or analogy, the simile would necessarily turn out to be a
literal comparison—we will see that the similarity or likeness-relation
between the terms related is not processed for metaphors through similes.
Instead, we may state that the similarity relation between the terms is imposed onto similes
through the metaphor, which
means that metaphors govern similes by defining the limits of likeness, and
not vice versa. Metaphors precede similes by being their onto-logical
presupposition, and this is the reason why we can say that metaphors make
room for the creation of
similarity aspects rather than merely being derivative of already existent
similarities, be they obvious or hidden. But this is also the reason why
similes and metaphors, without their mutual reducibility being a necessary
and true implication, are related to one another. These two reasons provide,
in my opinion, the necessary, but missing, fundament for interactionist
theories of metaphor (Kittay 1987, 1994 and Indurkhya 1992, 1994) which
insist that metaphors, at least novel ones, are essentially characterized by
their ability to create new similarities, rather than by their dependence on
already existing ones.[24] Once we see this
priority of metaphor as condition of possiblity of likeness-relations, we can
understand that, although similes are also, at least in part, parasitic on
the ontological precondition of "not being the case", this
precondition is provided only by metaphors and processed into further
linguistic functions (predication, attribution, reference) without
relating to similes. We can
also understand that it is this feature of metaphors which prevents similes,
despite their sharing in part the same ontological presupposition with
metaphors, from replacing or approximating metaphors in every discursive
context or at any level of the same discourse. For although we may accept as
true that there is not much difference in the comprehensibility of sentences such as "Juliet is the
sun" and "Juliet is like the sun", we know that the
grammatical function of "being like" cannot allow for the noun
phrase "the sun" of the predicate to become an attributive and referring term capable of replacing "Juliet". The condition for this replacement can be
provided only by the metaphor "Juliet is the sun", by virtue of its
grammatical form. Nor can, for the same reason, Plato's figure of the sun in
the Republic permit
"the sun" to become the referring term of the highest principle. In
order to make it possible, a metaphor must be in operation, and not a simile. Hence, the tropological
quandaries involved in the relationship between metaphors and similes have
revealed themselves as profound family disturbances within related tropes: it
is not similes which explain the metaphor, but it is metaphors that prepare
the ground for similes to be linguistically permissible and intersubjectively
comprehensible. The supposedly inexplicable difference in expressive strength
between metaphors and similes, which caused so much trouble to friends of
metaphor, appears to be the product of nothing more grandiose than the difference
in linguistic function in predication and comparison. This difference
indicates a deeper and more basic difference in the logical relationship
between metaphors and similes, rendering metaphors antecendent to all
figurative language use. In this sense, it is not constitutive of metaphors
to relate to similes as a more extended or more "comprehensible"
form of figurative speech—for, as we have seen, the only element of a
simple predicative simile which is more comprehensible when compared with the
corresponding metaphor is the semantic marker itself—but that metaphors
are due to linguistic procedures which are characteristic of literal language
use. Metaphors do open the linguistic framework and conditions of
comprehensibility for similes. However, they operate at the same
level—by their very linguistic function—as literal predication
procedures but not as similes. Hence, similes reveal themselves to be "a
false currency" in the attempt to explain the origin of metaphors as well
as their comprehensibility and cognitive impact on our language and
knowledge. Though metaphors themselves need not be considered unrelated to
the similarity implication in similes, the similarity processing by similes
does not explain why and how metaphors arise in language. This is the reason
why passing through the 'like' on to metaphors only produces further similes
but not metaphors. A metamorphosis of comparison tropes into metaphors is
only possible by starting from the literal processing of likeness. Hence
similes may allude to metaphors, but analyzing them on the basis of family
resemblances between the tropes results in illusions about metaphors. The
metaphoric function of language, if there is one, must be different from the
linguistic function of similes. Bibliography: (containing the literature mentioned or commented upon) Black, M. (1962), Metaphor, in: Models and Metaphors, Ithaca UP;
cf. also How Metaphors Work in: Sachs, S. (ed.), On Metaphor, Chicago:
Chicago UP 1978; and More on Metaphor in: Ortony (ed.) 1979 Boyd, R. (1979), Metaphor and Theory Change: What is
"Metaphor" a Metaphor for?, in: Ortony (ed.) 1979 Davidson, D. (1984), What Metaphors Mean in: Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation, Oxford UP de Man, P. (1978), The Epistemology of Metaphor, in: Critical
Inquiry 5 (1978) Debatin, B. (1995), Die Rationalität der Metapher. Eine
sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung, Berlin: de
Gruyter Derrida, J. (1972), La mythologie blanche, in: Marges de la
Philosophie, Paris; also Le retrait de la métaphore in: Psyche. L'invention
de l'autre Paris 1987 Fogelin, R. (1994), Metaphors, Similes, and Similarity, in:
Hintikka (ed.) 1994 Haack, S. (1994), "Dry
Truth and Real Knowledge". Epistemologies of Metaphor and Metaphors of
Epistemology, in: J. Hintikka (ed.) 1994 Hintikka J./Sandu, G. (1994), Metaphor and Other Kinds of
Nonliteral Meaning, in: Hintikka (ed.) 1994 Hintikka, J. (1994) (ed.), Aspects of Metaphor, Dordrecht/Boston/London:
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